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OLAF MERTELSMANN & AIGI RAHI-TAMM
CLEANSING AND COMPROMISE
The Estonian SSR in 1944-19451
When the Red Army liberated or re-conquered Soviet territory from the German
forces during World War II, it had to tackle the problem of what to do with a
population that might have cooperated or collaborated with the enemy. Special
concern had to be given to the newly acquired territories, occupied and annexed by
the USSR in 1939-1940 as a result of the Soviet-German treaty of non-aggression
and its secret protocols. Stalin was able to conquer a territory inhabited by
approximately 23 million people stretching from the Baltic to the Black Sea. Three
independent states, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, lost sovereignty and became
Soviet republics. Eastern Poland and Romanian territory were annexed as well.
One year of Soviet rule in the Baltic republics and two in Eastern Poland had turned
the majority of the population in the western borderlands against the new regime,
and the invading German forces, sometimes helped by local anti-Soviet partisans,
the ‘forest brethren’, were mostly greeted as liberators in the summer of 1941.
Troops mobilised in the newly acquired territories and those already existing there
initially proved unreliable. As a result of mass desertion,2 most soldiers from the
western borderlands were transferred to labour battalions, where they served during
the first months of the war mostly under awful conditions. All this, of course, was
noted by Moscow and in the Soviet rear preparations for later recovery of the lost
territories started early.
1. This paper was written in the framework of the project “Estonia in the Cold War”
(SF0180050s09).
2. Approximately 2,000 Estonians deserted at the beginning of the war. Alexander Statiev,
Social Conflict and Counterinsurgency in the Western Borderlands, 1944-1950 (PhD-thesis,
University of Calgary, 2004), 37.
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Our paper deals with the concrete example of the Estonian SSR (ESSR) and the
postwar cleansing that took place there.3 The country, with 1.1 million inhabitants
and approximately the size of the Netherlands, gained sovereignty from Russia as
a result of a war of independence in 1918-1920 fought in the context of the Russian
Civil War. The young democracy was among the many states establishing
statehood after the breakdown of the Russian, German and Austrian-Hungarian
empires in Central and Eastern Europe. Severing economic ties with the former
centre proved particularly difficult.4 Nevertheless, the process of state building
succeeded. A land reform dividing up the large estates improved the fate of the
peasants and created tens of thousands middle-sized farms. The urban population
benefited from new education and career opportunities. During two decades of
independence, Estonian high culture5 and Estonian language instruction
developed at all levels of the educational system. More social equality than under
the old tsarist regime, rising living standards, the improvement of living
conditions and a clear trend toward catching-up with Western Europe made the
interwar statehood a success story in general, but the Great Depression hit Estonia
and took a heavy toll. In the early 1930s, a right-wing movement, the Estonian
Veterans’ League, gained an increasing number of supporters.6 The year 1934
marked the breakdown of democracy, and one of the founding fathers of the
republic, Konstantin Päts, established authoritarian rule after a coup d’état.
However, as he was one of the less repressive leaders of the region, the
3. For an historic overview see: Romuald Misiunas, Rein Taagepera, The Baltic States: Years
of Dependence, 1940-1990 (London: Hurst, 1993); Jüri Ant, Eesti 1939-1941: rahvast,
valitsemisest, saatusest [Estonia 1939-1941: about the People, the Governing and the Fate]
(Tallinn: Riiklik Eksami- ja Kvalifikatsioonikeskus, 1999); Anu Mai Kõll, ed., The Baltic
Countries under Occupation: Soviet and Nazi Rule 1939-1991 (Stockholm: Almqvist &
Wiksell, 2003); Olaf Mertelsmann, ed., The Sovietization of the Baltic States, 1940-1956
(Tartu: Kleio, 2003); O. Mertelsmann, ed., Vom Hitler-Stalin-Pakt bis zu Stalins Tod. Estland
1939-1953 (Hamburg: Bibliotheca Baltica, 2005); Ago Pajur, Tõnu Tannberg, eds., Eesti
ajalugu VI: Vabadussõjast taasiseseisvumiseni [Estonian History VI: From the War of
Independence until the Regaining of Independence] (Tartu, 2005); Toomas Hiio, Meelis
Maripuu, Indrek Paavle, eds., Estonia 1940-1945: Reports of the Estonian International
Commission for the Investigation of Crimes against Humanity (Tallinn, 2006);
O. Mertelsmann, Der stalinistische Umbau in Estland: Von der Markt- zur
Kommandowirtschaft (Hamburg Kova©, 2006); David Feest, Zwangskollektivierung im
Baltikum: Die Sowjetisierung des estnischen Dorfes 1944-1953 (Cologne-Weimar-Vienna:
Böhlau, 2007); Tõnu Tannberg, ed., Eesti NSV aastatel 1940-1953: Sovetiseerimise
mehhanismid ja tagajärjed Nõukogude Liidu ja Ida-Euroopa arengute kontekstis [The Estonian
SSR 1940-1953: Mechanisms of Sovietisation and their Legacy in the Context of
Developments in the USSR and Eastern Europe] (Tartu: Eesti Ajalooarhiiv, 2007); Elena
Zubkova, Pribaltika i Kreml´ 1940-1953 [Pribaltika and the Kremlin 1940-1953] (M.:
ROSSPEN, 2008); Tõnu Tannberg, Politika Moskvy v respublikakh Baltii v poslevoennye
gody (1944-1956): Issledovaniia i dokumenty [The Poltics of Moscow in the Baltic Republics
in the Postwar Years (1944-1956): Research and Documents] (Tartu: Tartu University Press,
2008).
4. Jaak Valge, Breaking away from Russia: Economic Stabilization in Estonia 1918-1924
(Stockholm: Acta Universitatis Stockholmiensis, 2006).
5. As a late-coming peasant nation, Estonians did not possess a real high culture under the tsars.
This was developed during the period of independence.
6. Andres Kasekamp, The Radical Right in Interwar Estonia (Houndmills: Macmillan, 2000).
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foundations of civil society eroded anyway. Still, the regime somehow benefited
from improving of international economic conditions, and the second half of the
1930s saw rising standards of living again.
In September 1939, after the signing of the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact, the USSR
threatened the Baltic States with an ultimatum and pressed for the stationing of
Soviet troops, which the Baltic leaders granted. The Soviets promised not to
interfere in internal affairs, but broke regulations by using their Baltic airports for
air attack on Finland during the Winter War. In the shadow of Hitler’s campaign in
the West in June 1940, a second ultimatum pushed for an increase in the number of
stationed troops and the establishment of new, Soviet-friendly governments in the
Baltic States. Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania agreed under severe pressure and the
threat of war. Stalin’s special emissary in Tallinn, Andrei Zhdanov, supervised the
first steps of Sovietisation and hand-selected the members of the new government.
After mock elections and the puppet parliament’s application for incorporation into
the Soviet Union, Stalin ‘allowed’ the Baltic States to become Soviet republics in
August 1940.7 
The first year of Soviet rule in 1940-1941 brought the restructuring of the
existing state apparatus, the first waves of arrests of real and potential opponents to
the new regime, a step-by-step Sovietisation process and a severe decline in the
standard of living due to gradual transition to command economy and economic
exploitation. A first wave of mass deportation on 14 June 1941 shocked the
population and put an end to last illusions about the new regime. After the
beginning of operation ‘Barbarossa’, a second wave of terror hit the country.
Prisoners were tortured and killed and destruction battalions ran wild in the
countryside while the German troops were advancing.8 Local units of ‘forest
brethren’, anti-Soviet partisans, supported the German move forward and liberated
some regions on their own. The Soviets were able to mobilise approximately
35,000 soldiers and to evacuate, partly by force, 25,000 people. According to an
order by Lev Mekhlis, head of the political administration of the Red Army and
deputy people’s commissar of Defence, Estonian soldiers were sent to labour
battalions.9 The survivors would serve in the Red Army. Mobilized soldiers as well
as evacuees in the Soviet hinterland could later be used as a base for recruitment for
the preparations of recovering Estonia.
The aim of the paper is to analyse the USSR’s two policy approaches to the
recaptured Estonian SSR in 1944-1945: cleansing and compromise. The literature
7. For a new account of the events based on archival research see Zubkova, Pribaltika i
Kreml´…, 44-101. 
8. More than 2,000 victims of destruction battalions and the killing of prisoners have been
identified today, Meelis Maripuu, Argo Kuusik, “Political Arrests and Court Cases from
August 1940 to September 1941,” in Hiio, Maripuu, Paavle, eds., Estonia 1940-1945…, 327.
On destruction battalions see Indrek Paavle, Peeter Kaasik, “Destruction Battalions in
Estonia,” ibid., 469-487.
9. Peeter Kaasik, “Formation of the Estonian Rifle Corps in 1941-1942,” in Hiio, Maripuu,
Paavle, eds., Estonia 1940-1945…, 886.
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on the subject stresses, with good reason, the aspects of purges and repression;10
however, the possibility of a policy of compromise is usually not well represented.
To understand the immediate postwar period one has to take both aspects into
consideration. The scale of repression is often exaggerated in literature. Historians
in exile estimate the number of people deported from and killed in Estonia in 1944-
1945 to be approximately 30,000.11 Mart Laar even offered the figure of
75,000 arrested persons, of which approximately one third died in camps or were
shot.12 A recent publication speaks of “a war of annihilation against the national
elites” in the Baltic republics.13 The authors of this paper estimate that
approximately 13 to 15,000 persons fell victims to postwar cleansing. This number
is much smaller than the amount of persons who could have been accused of being
too close to the Germans or being ‘bourgeois nationalists’. There obviously was a
need to come to terms with ‘hostile elements’ through a policy of compromise and
not solely through the use of repressive measures. The paper is organised as
follows: we briefly explore the scale of Estonian collaboration seen from the Soviet
perspective and Soviet preparations in the rear, and then continue with describing
and analysing the two-edged policy of cleansing and compromise. 
Collaboration in Estonia seen from the Soviet perspective
Even though the German troops were greeted as liberators from Soviet oppression,
and Nazi propaganda exploited that topic for a certain time, the Estonian population
was soon disappointed with the new occupiers.14 Hopes for re-establishing
10. On Soviet repressions in Estonia see for example: David Feest, “Terror und Gewalt auf dem
estnischen Dorf,” Osteuropa, 50, 6 (2000): 656-671; Kristi Kukk, Toivo Raun, eds., Soviet
Deportations in Estonia: Impact and Legacy: Articles and Life Histories (Tartu: Tartu University
Press, 2007); Leo Õispuu, comp., Political Arrests in Estonia, 3 vols. (Tallinn, 1996-2005),
Deportation from Estonia to Russia, 3 vols. (Tallinn, 1999-2003); Aigi Rahi-Tamm, Teise
maailmasõja järgsed massirepressioonid Eestis: Allikad ja uurimisseis [Mass Repression in
Estonia after World War II: Sources and State of Research] (Tartu: Tartu Ülikooli Kirjastus,
2004); Vello Salo, ed., The White Book: Losses inflicted on the Estonian Nation by Occupation
Regimes 1940-1991 (Tallinn: Estonian Encyclopaedia Publishers, 2005).
11. Misiunas, Taagepera, The Baltic States…, 354. Rein Taagepera calls the period 1945-1953
“years of genocide,” Rein Taagepera, Estonia: Return to Independence (Boulder-San
Francisco-Oxford: Westview Press, 1993), 77. 
12. Mart Laar, “Eesti ja kommunism [Estonia and Communism],” in Stéphane Courtois et al.,
eds., Kommunismi must raamat: Kuriteod, terror, repressioonid [The Black Book of
Communism: Crimes, Terror, Repression] (Tallinn: Varrak, 2000), 853.
13. Jörg Barberowski, Anselm Doering-Manteuffel, Ordnung durch Terror: Gewaltexzesse
und Vernichtung im nationalsozialistischen und im stalinistischen Imperium (Bonn: Dietz,
2006), 88.
14. On the German occupation see: Seppo Myllyniemi, Die Neuordnung der baltischen Länder
1941-1944: Zum nationalsozialistischen Inhalt der deutschen Besatzungspolitik (Helsinki:
Suomen historiallinen seura, 1973); Alvin Isberg, Zu den Bedingungen des Befreiers:
Kollaboration und Freiheitsstreben in dem von Deutschland besetzten Estland 1941 bis 1944
(Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell, 1992); Indrek Paavle, ed., Population Losses in Estonia.
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independence or at least autonomy were not fulfilled. The Germans continued the
policy of economic exploitation started by the Soviets. They won some support by
revising the Soviet land reform, which was highly unpopular among peasants with
average or larger landholdings. In general, German policy was less repressive
towards ordinary Estonians than the Soviet one. Real or alleged communists and
sympathisers were, of course, persecuted and often killed, but ordinary Estonian
citizens remained vastly untouched. Estonian Jews perished in the Holocaust and
part of the Roma population was murdered. Ethnic Russians were overrepresented
among the victims of Nazi rule15. Approximately 8,000 inhabitants of the country
were killed during three years of occupation. Most of the killing took place in 1941
and statistics indicate a declining level of repression in the following years.16 In
addition, approximately 15,000 Soviet prisoners of war (POWs) and 6,500 foreign
Jews were murdered or died in camps.17 Thus, the large amount of victims
notwithstanding, many Estonians saw Hitler as the lesser of two evils. This might
help explain the widespread cooperation and even collaboration with the Germans.
From a Soviet point of view, collaboration reached unbearable levels and
obviously the share of population fighting actively on the side of the Germans was
larger than in any other part of German-occupied Europe. Anti-Soviet partisan units
had spread up spontaneously in the summer of 1941. Some were involved in
reprisal actions against communists and sympathisers. All able-bodied males aged
17 to 60 had to serve in ‘Self-Defence’ (Omakaitse). Their official number reached
73,000 in 1944,18 but was obviously smaller in reality. Most of them were simply
on guarding duties after work hours once or twice a week. However, there were
single units of ‘Self-Defence’ manned with full-time soldiers that took part in
German war crimes in 1941. More than 70,000 Estonians, approximately 7 percent
of the population, served as ‘volunteer’ legionaries, members of police battalions,
mobilised Waffen SS soldiers or in other units on the German side, but it must be
stressed that many ‘volunteers’ were in fact pressed into service. Some police
battalions fought in the antipartisan war and gained a bad reputation as a second
occupying force in neighbouring Russian oblasts, as in the Pskov oblast, for
instance.19 Up to 95 percent of Security Police employees (Sicherheitspolizei) in
15. Estonia’s Russians constituted 9 percent of the population, but 15 percent of the victims of
the Nazis.
16. Indrek Paavle, “Sissejuhatus [Introduction],” in Paavle, ed., Population Losses…, 13, 17.
17. Anton Weiss-Wendt, Murder without Hatred: Estonians, the Holocaust, and the Problem of
Collaboration (PhD-thesis, Brandeis University, 2005), 611.
18. Statiev, Social Conflict and Counterinsurgency, op.cit., 67.
19. Anna Kormina, Sergej ∑tyrkov, “Niemand und nichts ist vergessen. Die Okkupation in
mündlichen Zeugnissen,” Osteuropa, 55, 4-6 (2005), 447-449.
II/1: German Occupation 1941-1944 (Tartu: Okupatsioonide Repressiivpoliitika Uurimise
Riiklik Komisjon, 2002); Hiio, Maripuu, Paavle, eds., Estonia 1940-1945…; Ruth Bettina
Birn, Die Sicherheitspolizei in Estland, 1941-1944: Eine Studie zur Kollaboration im Osten
(Paderborn: Schoningh, 2006).
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Estonia were ethnic Estonians.20 They served thus at the centre of the German
repressive apparatus. Obviously, the majority of concentration and POW camp guards
also were locals.21 All levels of the administration including the upper levels of the
Estonian Self-Administration (Landeseigene Selbstverwaltung, Omavalitsus) were in
the hands of Estonians, but they stood under German control of the German Civil
Administration (deutsche Zivilverwaltung). This was part of German labour-saving
policy in occupied Estonia: as much administrative or police work as possible had to
be conducted by locals under German supervision (Aufsichtsverwaltung).22 One
should not forget that ethnic minorities like Russians and Swedes also entered
German service. In the concentration camp system Vaivara for example, Russian
Schutzmannschaftskompanien served as guards.23 In September 1944, according to
one researcher, only 4,500 of the 60,000 Estonian troops serving along different lines
in the Waffen-SS, Border Defence Units, etc., were evacuated from Estonia.24 Viewed
from Moscow, nearly all adult males staying in occupied Estonia could be considered
suspect and guilty. Former members of parties and other organisations of the prewar
republic were also highly suspicious and they were often claimed to be bourgeois
nationalists. In comparison with the smaller support for the Germans exposed by
Crimean Tatars, Chechens or Kalmyks, who were deported collectively as a reprisal,
Estonian cooperation and collaboration with the Germans had reached a higher level.
The Soviet leadership was clearly determined to purge the Estonian SSR.
When Soviet troops began to invade the country in the fall of 1944, more than
70,000 Estonians fled to Scandinavia or Germany.25 It seems obvious that the
majority of high-ranking collaborators or real perpetrators, who committed war
crimes or participated in the Holocaust, were among them, but they formed, of
course, only a small minority of all refugees. Most of the people fled because they
feared Soviet terror and reprisals. Before German troops left Estonia, they helped
form a number of anti-Soviet partisan units. Other units formed spontaneously and
thousands hid in the forests in fear of arrest or mobilisation into the Red Army.
Armed resistance only started to fade out in the late 1940s, and ended in the mid-
1950s.26 During the German evacuation in September 1944, a short-lived provisional
20. Argo Kuusik, “Security Police and SD in Estonia in 1941-1944,” in Hiio, Maripuu, Paavle,
eds., Estonia 1940-1945…, 592.
21. Helmut Krausnick, Hans-Heinrich Wilhelm, Die Truppe des Weltanschauungskrieges: Die
Einsatzgruppen der Sicherheitspolizei und des SD 1938-1942 (Stuttgart: Deutsche Vlg-Anst.,
1981), 597.
22. Meelis Maripuu, Indrek Paavle, “Die deutsche Zivilverwaltung in Estland und die estnische
Selbstverwaltung,” in Mertelsmann, ed., Vom Hitler-Stalin-Pakt…, 96-129.
23. Aivar Niglas, Toomas Hiio, “Estonian Defence Battalions, Police Battalions in the German
Armed Forces,” in Hiio, Maripuu, Paavle, eds., Estonia 1940-1945…, 867.
24. Isberg, Zu den Bedingungen…, 142.
25. Kaja Kumer-Haukanõmm, Tiit Rosenberg, Tiit Tammaru, eds., Suur põgenemine 1944:
Eestlaste lahkumine läände ning selle mõjud [The Big Flight 1944: Estonians leaving for the
West and the Effects] (Tartu: Tartu Ülikooli Kirjastus, 2006).
26. Mart Laar, War in the Woods: Estonia’s Struggle for Survival, 1944-1956 (Washington
DC: Compass Press, 1992); Arvydas AnuÒauskas, ed., The Anti-Soviet Resistance in the Baltic
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Estonian government headed by Otto Tief was established in Tallinn and partly took
control of the city with the help of the Estonian units it commanded.27 Thus, in the fall
of 1944, the capital of the Estonian SSR was technically speaking ‘liberated’ by the
Soviets from the Estonians and not from the Nazis with the flag of independent
Estonia flying on government buildings for a short while instead of the swastika.
When the Soviets mobilised Estonians into the Red Army in 1944-1945, they found
out that many of them were veterans of German units who had thrown their uniforms
away and gone home during the German retreat, thus risking punishment as deserters.
Most of the Soviet troops were not greeted with cheers when they marched in,
with the possible exception of the Estonian Rifle Corps, a unit specially designed
for ethnic Estonians. Soviet soldiers felt and partly behaved as if on enemy
territory.28 Soviet rule in the countryside proved extremely weak. The population
was hostile and anti-Russian.29 The extreme lack of reliable local cadres made the
situation even more difficult.
From today’s perspective, the question of collaboration is rather complicated,
starting with the fact that there is no simple definition for it.30 Estonia was occupied and
lost independence in 1940; there was no internationally recognised government in exile.
Its citizens received Soviet citizenship against their will and lived for three years under
German occupation. While some Estonians definitely participated in German crimes,
one can hardly speak of treason to the fatherland. They did not owe Stalin or the Soviet
government any loyalty. Obviously, the Soviets interpreted activities such as serving in
the lower ranks of Nazi administration or being a village elder as collaboration —
occupations which usually would not be considered collaboration.
Preparations in the Soviet Rear
Evacuees initially faced meagre living conditions, but the Estonian soldiers in
labour battalions were definitely worse off. Their camps, labour duties and
27. Andres Parmas, ed., Otto Tief ja 1944 a. vahevalitsus [Otto Tief and the Interim
Government of 1944] (Tartu, 2006); Mart Laar, September 1944: Otto Tiefi valitsus
[September 1944: Otto Tief’s Government] (Tallinn: Varrak, 2007).
28. Local authorities complained about theft, robbery, rape and even murder. According to a
report on the work of the militsiia, Red Army soldiers perpetrated the majority of registered
crimes in the fourth quarter of 1944, ERAF (Eesti Riigiarhiivi Filiaal — Branch of the Estonian
State Archives), 1-3-435, 1.
29. O. Mertelsmann, “How the Russians Turned into the Image of the ‘National Enemy’ of the
Estonians,” Pro Ethnologia,  19 (2005): 43-58.
30. See Joachim Tauber, ed., “Kollaboration” in Nordosteuropa: Erscheinungsformen und
Deutungen im 20. Jahrhundert (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 2006).
States (Vilnius: Du Ka, 1999); Pearu Kuusk, Nõukogude võimu lahingud Eesti
vastupanuliikumisega: Banditismivastase Võitluse Osakond aastatel 1944-1947 [The Battles
of Soviet Power with Estonian Resistance: The Department for Fighting against Banditism
1944-1947] (Tartu: Tartu Ülikooli Kirjastus, 2007); Elena Zubkova, “‘Lesnye brat´ia’ v
Pribaltike: voina posle voiny [‘Forest Brothers’ in the Baltic: War after the War],”
Otechestvennaia istoriia, 51, 2 (2007): 74-90, et 3 (2007): 14-30.
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provision of food had been ill-prepared due to the war. Minimal food rations, forced
neck-breaking work, inadequate clothing or shelter, hunger, overwork and the cold
took a grim toll. Approximately one third of the men died within six months.31
During the winter of 1941-1942, the survivors were freed, fed and incorporated into
new fighting units, especially the Estonian Rifle Corps or, in case of ill health, sent
to work in the rear.
Preparations for recapturing Estonia started slowly, but immediately. Evacuated
artists were for example assembled in Iaroslavl to form art ensembles and groups.
From February 1942 to February 1944, in Moscow and afterwards Leningrad, the
Bureau of the Central Committee of the Estonian CP strove to assemble party
functionaries, prepare propaganda for the homeland, support Soviet partisans there,
which failed, and make arrangements for the postwar order in their native
country.32 In 1943, preparations gained speed. The party recruited new members
among Estonian soldiers and evacuees. Special courses were offered to train tractor
drivers, bookkeepers or NKVD specialists for future service in Estonia. Soviet
institutions were built up to be implanted in the ESSR after victory. The state also
recruited ethnic Estonians from the ‘old republics’ for a mission in their ‘historic
fatherland’. As early as December 1943, the NKVD of the ESSR comprised
roughly 400 cadres and the NKGB approximately 170, nine months before they
began serving inside Estonia. Nevertheless, the leading Estonian communists
thought that they were far too few to fulfil the necessary duties after the ‘liberation’.
New courses had to be held and more cadres recruited.33 
Special attention was given to the preparation of future purges. Archives played
an important role in those repressions. In 1940, the Estonian archives system
became attached to the NKVD. When Gottlieb Ney, still director of the Estonian
State Archives at that moment, expressed surprise over the subordination of the
archives to the NKVD, Fomin, head of the Central Archival Administration of the
NKVD (Glavnoe Arkhivnoe Upravlenie NKVD SSSR, abbreviated GAU),
answered that the commonly shared view that archives were research institutions
should quickly be forgotten. This might be so in the capitalist world, but in “the
Soviet country the main task of archives is to expose class enemies in order that
they be destroyed.”34
31. Urmas Usai, ed., Eestlased tööpataljonides 1941-1942. Mälestusi ja dokumente. Esimene
raamat [Estonians in Labour Battalions 1941-1942. Memories and Documents. First Book]
(Tallinn: Olion, 1993), 5-18.
32. Olaf Kuuli, Sotsialistid ja kommunistid Eestis 1917-1991 [Socialists and Communists in
Estonia 1917-1991] (Tallinn: O. Kuuli, 1999), 88-89; Olev Liivik, “Keskkomitee [Central
Committee],” in Enn Tarvel, ed., Eestimaa Kommunistliku Partei Keskkomitee
organisatsiooniline struktuur 1940-1991 [The Organisational Structure of the Central Committee
of the Estonian Communist Party] (Tallinn: Kistler-Ritso Eesti Sihtasutus, 2002), 35.
33. Meeting of the Bureau of the CC of the ECP(b), 24 and 28 December 1943, ERAF 1-4-97,
85-86.
34. Gottlieb Ney, “Teadlasest tshekistiks [From Scientist to Chekist],” in Richard Maasing, ed.,
Eesti riik ja rahvas Teises maailmasõjas. Punane aasta [The Estonian State and Nation in the
Second World War. The Red Year], vol. 3 (Stockholm: EMP, 1956), 154.
CLEANSING AND COMPROMISE 327
In October 1940, the NKVD archival departments in Ukraine, Belorussia,
Moldova, Karelia, Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia were ordered to introduce the
registration of their ‘counterrevolutionary elements’. It was a continuation of the
all-Union card index of ‘politically coloured persons’ that had been introduced one
year previous, in September 1939. In the spring of 1941, the cards files on ‘political
colouring’ already registered 37,794 persons in Estonia.35 The compilation of the
card index was continued in Kirov in the Soviet rear, where the materials of the
special department of the Estonian State Archives had been evacuated. The card
index was supplemented by approximately 53,000 new cards.
From February till August 1944, the head of the Department of the Estonian
Archives Bernhard Veimer stayed in Leningrad in order to work through the
newspapers that had been published in Estonia during German occupation. In those
papers he had to search for ‘anti-Soviet elements’. The sought persons were not
only political figures, policemen or mobilised servicemen in the German army, but
also economists, farmers, members of the clergy, scientists, artists, sportsmen,
newspaper reporters, etc. On 7 July 1944, Veimer presented the data to the would-
be chiefs of the county departments of the NKVD-NKGB, who then drew up
special lists.36 In 1944, when preparations were made to reconquer Estonia, the
Central Archival Administration repeatedly reminded Veimer of the requirement
that the archives had to inform the security organs and SMERSH about confidential
materials in stocks and help them in their operative work.37 In the fall of 1944,
about 160,000 biographical cards had been added to the Soviets’ operative use.
Those personal biographical cards had been compiled by the Germans between
1941 and 1944 and had been left in Estonia after their retreat. The cards contained
data mainly about those Estonian citizens who had served in the German troops,
been killed, wounded or missing at the front. 
Compilation of the files continued in Tallinn after October 1944. In 1945, more
than 45,000 cards were filed. The main emphasis was placed on searching through
the holdings of the institutions operating during German occupation. The archives
had to provide the necessary information about the structure of those institutions for
the operative departments.38 Simultaneously, the archives gathered data about
former members of ‘Self-Defence’ and German units, or about those missing or
fallen into captivity. In the main focus of interest was information about an
35. Svodnyi ochet otdela sekretnykh fondov, 25 December 1942, ERAF R1490-1-1, 13;
Margus Lääne, Valdur Ohmann, “Kuidas komprat koguti? NKGB infoallikad 1941 aastast
osaliselt säilinud operatiivandmete põhjal [How Kompromat was collected? The Information
Sources of NKGB in 1941 on the Basis of partly preserved Operation Data],” Tuna 10, 4
(2007): 86-88.
36. Report by Bernhard Veimer to Nikitinskii, head of the GAU NKVD SSR, and Aleksander
Resev, head of the NKVD ESSR, “Dokladnaia zapiska o prodelannoi rabote za vremia moego
prebyvaniia v Leningrade ot 4/II do 25/VII”, 27 July 1944, ERAF 17/1-1-7, 38. 
37. Letter by Gurianov, deputy head of the GAU NKVD SSR, to Berhard Veimer, ERA (Eesti
Riigiarhiiv — Estonian State Archives), R-2338-1-34, 94.
38. “Plan raboty Arkhivnogo Otdela NKVD ESSR,” 24 January 1945, ERA R-2338-1-59, 3.
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individual’s political loyalty. Every person who had been questioned as a witness at
interrogation, was registered as well.
Three operational groups were prepared and trained in the Soviet rear to
establish Soviet power in Estonia after liberation. Their actions were to be
coordinated by a particular operation staff of the NKVD.39 Those operational
groups went into action immediately after the Red Army’s offensive in the late
summer of 1944. At that time the groups were assigned the following tasks: finding
individuals who had cooperated with the Germans, traitors, enemy agents and anti-
Soviet elements; liquidation of Nazi and espionage cells; destruction of anti-Soviet
partisan units; organisation of counterintelligence against foreign intelligence
services and centres of Baltic emigrants.40 The operational groups approached
together with the Red Army and should conduct the registration of the local
population, control documents and screen people.41
Cleansing and Compromise
When the Soviets retook control of Estonia in September 1944, the population had
declined by one quarter. According to the estimation of the Statistical Office, on
1 January 1945 there lived 854,000 people in the ESSR, 280,000 less than in the
late 1930s. The reasons for this drop were manifold. Roughly 20,000 people, not all
of them ethnic Germans, were part of the resettlement of Baltic Germans between
1939 and 1941. When German troops arrived, the population had already dropped
by 100,000 due to Soviet evacuation, one mass deportation, mobilisation and
arrests. The Germans killed approximately 8,000 people, 30,000 died in the war,
7,000 ethnic Swedes resettled to Sweden and more than 70,000 Estonians flew
abroad. A small number served as Ostarbeiter in Germany, mainly ethnic Russians.
Natural population growth had been negative since 1940. Additionally, Soviet
population data did not include soldiers, POWs and other prisoners, thus the real
population of the country was larger than indicated.42
The population increased later due to return migration from Russia, repatriation
from Germany usually after passing through a filtration camp,43 demobilisation of
39. Tõnu Tannberg, “Hilisstalinistlik Eesti NSV [The late Stalinist Estonian SSR],” Eesti
ajalugu VI, 273.
40. Report by Boris Kumm, ESSR minister of State Security, to the ECP(b) Central
Committee, “Dokladnaia zapiska o rabote organov gosudarstvennoi bezopasnosti Estonskoi
SSR za period 1940-1941 gg. i 1944-1948 gg.,” ERAF 1-47-37, 143-144.
41. Kuusk, Nõukogude võimu lahingud…, 29.
42. Mertelsmann, Der stalinistische Umbau…, 116-120. 
43. In 1945, 5,470 Estonians were repatriated. Report on the work of the Department for
Repatriation to Nikolai Karotamm, 9 October 1948, ERAF 1-47-29, 45. One author estimates
the total to be be approximately 12,000 in 1944-1945. Ranno Roosi, “Repatriations to Estonia
and Repatriation Policy in ESSR 1944-1955,” Hiio, Maripuu, Paavle, eds., Estonia 1940-
1945…, 1114. Another publication offers a figure of 14,300 repatriated persons to Estonia until
March 1946, Iu.A. Poliakov, ed., Naselenie Rossii v XX veke: Istoricheskie ocherki [The
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soldiers, release of POWs and members of labour battalions, and massive
immigration from the ‘old republics’. A first ethnic cleansing took place in the
summer of 1945. The few remaining ethnic Germans, approximately 400 persons,
including non-German family members who voluntarily followed, were deported.44
All foreign citizens in the republic, a total of 64, were observed with great scrutiny
and a special list of them was kept, which proved that single ethnic Germans
escaped deportation.45 A second wave of ethnic cleansing targeting ethnic Finns,
Ingrians and Karelians, took place in 1946-1947.46 The latter had settled down in
Estonia during or after the war because of the proximity of languages, the shared
protestant religion, and to flee from persecution in their homelands in Soviet
Karelia and the Leningrad oblast. Usually, they had 24 hours to leave for the
Russian interior. Their passports were stamped with the impression ‘§58-1’, which
meant ‘traitor’.
Together with the reoccupation of the Baltic republics, the attention of the
Kremlin became focussed for a short while on the ‘Baltic question’. Concerning all
three Baltic communist parties, the Orgbureau of the CC VKP(b) issued decisions
about ‘mistakes and deficits’ in the operation of party organisations between the
end of October and the beginning of November 1944. Those documents turned into
instructions for the continuation of the process of Sovietisation and influenced local
policy for the forthcoming years. The fight against ‘bourgeois nationalism’ was one
of the main issues for the Baltic parties.47 For all three Baltic republics special
bureaus were established at the Central Committee in Moscow to ease control, the
flow of information, the implementation of Soviet policy, and the cleansing of
‘enemy elements’.48 Obviously, in the late summer and fall of 1944, Stalin took the
situation under his control and met the first party secretaries of the Baltic republics
personally in August 1944. Later, this assignment was delegated to Andrei
44. Indrek Jürjo, “Täiendusi baltisakslaste ümberasutamise ja Eestisse jäänud sakslaste saatuse
kohta NKVD arhiivallikate põhjal [Additions to the Resettlement of Baltic Germans and the
Fate of Germans Remaining in Estonia on the Basis of NKVD Archival Documents],” in Sirje
Kivimäe, ed., Umsiedlung 60: Baltisakslaste organiseeritud lahkumine Eestist [Resettlement
60: The Organised Leaving of Baltic Germans from Estonia] (Tallinn: Baltisaksa Kultuuri Selts
Eestis, 2000), 109-134; A. Rahi-Tamm, “Deportation und Verfolgung in Estland 1939-1953,”
in Mertelsmann ed., Vom Hitler-Stalin-Pakt…, 211-237.
45. List of foreigners residing in the ESSR, 29 December 1945, ERAF 1-3-108. 
46. Riina Reinvelt, Ingeri elud ja lood: Kultuurianalüütiline eluloouurimus [Ingrian Lives and
Stories: Cultural-Analytical Life Story Research] (Tartu: Tartu Ülikooli etnoloogia õppetool,
2002).
47. Tõnu Tannberg, “Moskva institutsionaalsed ja nomenklatuursed kontrollimehhanismid
Eesti NSVs sõjajärgsetel aastatel [Moscow’s Institutional and Nomenclatural Control
Mechanisms in the Estonian SSR in the Postwar Years],” in Tannberg, ed., Eesti NSV aastatel
1940-1953…, 227. 
48. Ibid., 228-239; Geoffrey Swain, “‘Cleaning up Soviet Latvia’: the Bureau for Latvia
(Latburo), 1944-1947,” in Mertelsmann, ed., The Sovietization of the Baltic States…, 63-84.
Population of Russia in the 20th Century: Historical Scetch], T. 2. 1940-1959 (M. : ROSSPEN,
2001), 154. One source gives a figure of 20,252 by 1 September 1949, ERAF 17/1-1-141, 59. 
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Zhdanov, Georgii Malenkov and Mikhail Suslov,49 while Stalin was kept informed
about the activities of the respective bureaus.
Economic planning for reconstruction had already started in the rear, but the
plan followed the general Soviet tendency. The destroyed infrastructure — electric
power stations or bridges — would have to be rebuilt first. Then heavy industry and
the energy sector had to expand. The reconstruction of housing, food and consumer
goods production received only low priority in the planning, which partly explains
why it took so long for the population to recover from the war. Actually, the
provision of food and nutrition standards were worse in 1946-1947 than during the
war due to the influence of the famine in other Soviet regions and Soviet
agricultural policy.50 Economic transition and reconstruction was interwoven with
measures against ‘enemies’, especially during the second land reform (1944-1947).
Edgar Tõnurist, head of the Executive Committee of Tartu County, for example,
proclaimed in January 1945 that in his county alone more than 800 farms of
‘enemies of the people’ and ‘collaborators with the Germans’ had been reduced to a
size of five to seven hectares. He complained that “the class war with our enemies
in the villages has not reached its full scale yet.”51 Plenipotentiaries were sent to
villages to search together with local activists for ‘active collaborators’, often on
public meetings.52 In total, 123,000 hectares of land were confiscated53 from
approximately 9,000 households. Of course, there were single voices like that of a
certain comrade Tikk, who complained that ‘collaborators’ were pampered and
should be punished more severely.54 Many of the families later fell victim to the
mass deportation of 1949. Two thirds of the 20,600 deportees, among them
‘collaborators’, belonged to the category of ‘enemies of the people’. In September
1945, the confiscation was ordered of houses, farm equipment, animals and
personal belongings of those households, whose head fled with the Germans, or in
which a family member participated in the armed anti-Soviet partisan struggle.55 
After the arrival of the Red Army, the operational groups started their activities.
The members of the provisional government headed by Otto Tief and associated
circles were arrested. In October 1944, a cleansing operation began in Tallinn,
which led to 196 arrests. The Soviet NKGB (People’s Commissariat of State
Security) had ordered all institutions to hand over documents from the period of
German occupation to ease the search for potential enemies. In December 1944, the
49. Zubkova, Pribaltika i Kreml´…, 141-145.
50. Mertelsmann, Der stalinistische Umbau…, 93-99.
51. Stenographic protocol of the republican meeting of agricultural specialists, 17-19 January
1945, ERAF 1-4-239, 3.
52. Feest, “Terror und Gewalt…,”,  663.
53. Valner Krinal, Otto Karma, Herbert Ligi, Feliks Sauks, Eesti NSV majandusajalugu
[Economic History of the Estonian SSR] (Tallinn: Valgus, 1979), 182.
54. Protocol of the Estonian Peasant Conference, 22- 23 October 1944, ERAF 1-4-128, 94.
55. Aigi Rahi, 1949, aasta märtsiküüditamine Tartu linnas ja maakonnas [The March
Deportation 1949 in the Town and County of Tartu] (Tartu: Kleio, 1998), 26.
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Central Committee of the Estonian CP(b) decided that all passports had to be
exchanged, screening thus the entire urban population. Until the beginning of 1946,
a total of 280,000 new passports were issued after a thorough control of their
holders. In January 1945, there already were 4,200 persons in Estonian prisons.56 
In April 1944, the Estonian Central Committee, still in Leningrad, issued a
decision on the re-establishment of destruction battalions consisting of party and
Komsomol members, local activists and employees of party and security organs.
They were formed on a territorial basis between 1944 and 1945 and the Central
Staff was headed by First Party Secretary Nikolai Karotamm himself.57 The
destruction battalions had 1,653 members on 1 January 1945 and 5,804 one year
later.58 Participation was ‘voluntary’ and unpaid. They were used as a sort of
auxiliary unit for the militsiia, state security and NKVD in antipartisan warfare.
Initially, special security units dealt with partisans. After this failed, tactics changed
and the use of destruction battalions was preferred in 1945. Their military value
was actually quite small, members often had a low level of discipline and some
were involved, like many other soldiers and security personnel, in theft, robbery
and terrorising the local population.59
The party’s political priorities are revealed in a report to Stalin on the activities of
the Estonian Bureau of the Central Committee of VKP(b) dated from early May 1945:
The main activities of the Estonian Bureau were to deal with further cleansing
the republic of enemy elements, to strengthen local party and state organs, to
educate cadres, to reconstruct the economy, to conduct an agricultural reform
and to improve the political education of the population.
1. Cleansing the republic of enemy elements
The bourgeois-nationalist underground 
As we already reported, a large number of active participants of Estonian
military-fascist and bourgeois-nationalist organisations could not flee to
Germany, Sweden or Finland […]
According to this report, dated from October 1944 to April 1945, a total of
8,909 people were arrested for political reasons. The text mentions the offer of an
amnesty for those evading conscription into the Red Army by hiding in the forests.
Among the mobilised soldiers turning up in recruitment offices, mobilised veterans
of the German army served in labour or construction battalions.60 It is important
56. Tannberg, “Hilisstalinistlik Eesti NSV,” 275.
57. Tiit Noormets, Valdur Ohmann, “Saateks [Introduction],” in Tiit Noormets, Valdur
Ohmann, ed., Hävitajad. Nõukogude hävituspataljonid Eestis 1944-1954. Dokumentide
kogumik [Destroyers. Soviet Destroyer Battalions in Estonia 1944-1954. Compilation of
Documents] (Tallinn: Riigiarhiiv, 2006), 16-19.
58. Statiev, Social Conflict and Counterinsurgency…, 221.
59. Lembit Raid, “Kas peremees või käsualune? Ülevaade Parteiarhiivi materjalidest II [Master
or Subordinate? Overview of Materials from the Party Archives II],” Kleio, no. 8 (1993): 42-43.
60. Report on the activities of the Estonian Bureau of the CC VCP(b), 1 January-1 May 1945,
RGASPI (Rossiiskoi gosudarstvennyi arkhiv social´no-politicheskoi istorii), f. 598, op. 1, d. 2,
l. 2-6.
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that even though the report stresses the priority of cleansing, it also reveals
elements of the compromise policy in its proposal for amnesty. 
According to incomplete data of a research team headed by Leo Õispuu in 1944-
1945, at least 13,700 political arrests, or 37 percent of the total of the ten-year
period of Stalinism, took place. A total of 381 death penalties are documented and
2,600 arrested persons did not survive. From 1946 to 1953, only 178 death
penalties were registered in comparison to 1,874 in 1940-1941 due to the temporary
abandonment of the death sentence between May 1947 and January 1950.61 Thus,
postwar cleansing was less brutal than the destruction of Estonia’s elite before the
war. Still, the scale of arrests was so massive that according to the svodki, the
reports on the sentiment of the population, people were asking about those arrests at
public meetings.62
Soviet security searched for alleged and real collaborators and war criminals
among the Estonian German-army veterans, who were regular POWs or serving in a
labour battalion, in filtration camps or as regular soldiers in the Soviet army.
According to a directive dated October 1943 by Lavrentii Beriia and Vsevolod
Merkulov, the Soviet People’s Commissars of the Interior and State Security, all
former Baltic members of German units had at least to pass through filtration, soldiers
having participated in war crimes and officers were to be arrested.63 For example, in
SMERSH’s Special Filtration Camp no. 0316 located in Põllküla, 15,937 people,
among them 13,340 soldiers, had been controlled before 22 November 1945. Those
former Soviet soldiers, who had deserted their army and run over to the Germans,
usually received a punishment of six years in a special settlement. Obviously,
thousands received a similar sentence: for example, on 1 September 1945, a convoy
with 1,605 men, mainly Estonians, headed eastwards.64 Still, we assume that a certain
number of German-army veterans did not pass through any filtration camps. They
were sent directly to service in the Red Army or the labour and construction
battalions. Several of them were punished later.
In time, cleansing turned more and more against ‘bourgeois nationalists’. At the
fifth Plenum of the Estonian CP(b) in early December 1944, a warning was already
given against any Estonian special way. Arrests of intellectuals started afterwards.65
61. Õispuu, ed., Political Arrests, vol. 2, D5. The real amount of arrests was obviously slightly
larger. The same team did identify 25,000 political arrests between 1944 and 1952, while a
report for Khrushchev offered a number of 45,000 arrests for the same period (Zubkova,
Pribaltika i Kreml´…, 332). The figures for Khrushchev might have also included ordinary
crimes. Aleksandr Diukov’s estimation of 10,000 arrests for 1944-1945 is definitely too low.
See Aleksandr Diukov, Mif o genocide: Repressii sovetskikh vlastei v Estonii (1940-1953)
[The Genocide Myth: Repression of Soviet Power in Estonia (1940-1953)] (M.: Aleksei
Iakovlev, 2007), 89.
62. For example Svodka no. 4, 12 July 1945, ERAF 1-3-115, 14.
63. “Sovmestnaia direktiva NKVD SSSR i NKGB SSSR No. 494/94,” Diukov, Mif o
genocide…, 121-123.
64. Erich Kaup, “Sõjavangilaagrid Eestis 1944-1949 [POW Camps in Estonia 1944-1949],”
Kleio: Ajaloo ajakiri 2 (1995): 34-35.
65. Feest, “Terror und Gewalt…,” 664.
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Estonia’s first party secretary, Nikolai Karotamm, explained the wave of arrests to
local officials in the spring of 1945 in the following way: “When there are arrests, one
has to explain how much this is demanded, explain that the population demands it.
We receive anonymous letters, sometimes with a signature, sometimes without,
which describe how in a certain village some enemy is active.”66 Of course,
denunciations arrived, but the main initiative for cleansing came from the Kremlin
and there is no archival evidence for a broad popular support of the measures. In fact,
the regime encouraged denunciation and published corresponding articles in
newspapers. A decree by the ESSR Council of People’s Commissars dated 17 June
1945 regulated how complaints and denunciations should be handled by local
authorities. They should be registered and worked through for three days. In Soviet
institutions special boxes equipped with paper and pencil in visible places served to
take the complaints.67
Apart from ‘collaborators’, ‘bourgeois nationalists’, ‘bandits’ (anti-Soviet
partisans), ‘enemies of the people’ and also ‘former people’ fell under suspicion
and were purged from responsible positions. For example, the people’s commissar
for trade, Hansen, and his deputy, Jõgi, were rebutted by the ECP(b) Central
Committee Bureau for allowing too many former shop or restaurant owners to work
in the system of socialist trade. The Bureau held the ‘former people’ responsible for
all the shortcomings in trade caused by drinking, fraud, embezzlement and
corruption.68
On orders from Moscow, Baltic inmates of filtration camps were sent to camps
in their respective home countries in April 1946.69 They usually were released in
the following years. The regime dealt with Baltic POWs in the same manner. By
October 1948, out of 9,000 POWs arriving from other Soviet republics 7,900 had
already been released.70 According to a directive by the Soviet Ministry of the
Interior dated 20 April 1946, mobilised Balts serving in German units as privates or
sergeants were exempted from the usual punishment reserved for Soviet citizens
who had been members of the German forces: six years of forced labour in a special
settlement.71 This was an important difference in the treatment of German-army
veterans from the Baltic republics and those from other Soviet regions: only a
minority was arrested and punished. Some became regular soldiers of the Red
66. ERAF 1-4-245, 26.
67. The decree was even published. Rahi, 1949, aasta märtsiküüditamine…, 32.
68. Protocol of the meeting of the ECP(b) Central Committee Bureau, 7 June 1945, ERAF 1-4-
189, 33-35.
69. Zubkova, Pribaltika i Kreml´…, 164. 
70. Report on the work of the Department for Repatriation to Nikolai Karotamm, 9 October
1948, ERAF 1-47-29, 46.
71. “Vypiska iz direktivy ministra vnutrennikh del SSR, No. 97,” Sbornik zakonodatel´nykh i
normativnykh aktov o repressiiakh i reabilitatsii zhertv politicheskikh repressii [Collection of
Legal and Normative Acts concerning Repression and Rehabilitation of Victims of Political
Repression] (M.: Izd. Respublika, 1993), 114-116.
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Army, others served in labour or construction battalions and were released largely
in 1946-47, and a third group consisted of regular POWs.
Real perpetrators frequently received the death penalty during the postwar
years, and if not, were often released by 1956, remarkably earlier than ‘bourgeois-
nationalists’ or those Estonians deported as ‘nationalists’ for ‘eternal times’
(vyselennye navechno; napravliat´ na spetspocelenie navechno)72 in 1949. Others
were imprisoned until 1965. Looking at the archival evidence, it seems that
persecuting real and potential political enemies of the regime became far more
important than punishing war criminals and collaborators. This interpretation is
supported by the fact that crimes committed outside the Estonian SSR, as in the
case of members of police battalions, were rarely persecuted at all, because the
authorities paid less attention to them.73 The Holocaust trials in the 1960s and
1970s in Estonia and Latvia looked partly like show trials aiming to incriminate
Baltic émigrés.74 The defendants in the Estonian trial of 1961 were known to the
Soviet authorities much earlier, one had even been a KGB informer until the late
1950s.75 Most of the German security police’s files remained in the Tallinn archives
and western authorities had no access to them until the breakdown of the Soviet
Union. A number of war crimes could have been persecuted in the West if those
documents had been available. While we clearly see a peak in death penalties for
war crimes in the immediate postwar period, on the long run persecuting the real or
alleged opposition became far more important than punishing people involved in
the killing of communists and Jews during the war. On the one hand, we might
interpret this as part of the compromise policy. Collaboration with the Germans was
so widespread that it was perhaps preferable to silence the problem and establish an
image of the Estonians solely as Nazi victims by inflating the actual number of
casualties: the Extraordinary State Commission for the Investigation of War Losses
multiplied that number by eight. On the other hand, state security possessed a
steadily growing number of card files on the Estonian population. The amount of
compromising data accumulated in the course of massive inspection into archival
stocks was enormous. Broadly assessing it, about one third of the Estonian
population was recorded in the card index. There was much more information when
the state security used them for the purpose of direct accusations in the 1940s and
1950s. Dark spots in the life of a person could not only lead to discrimination, but
helped enforce obedience or could be used when recruiting informers and agents. In
72. “Eternal times” as far as even the next generation would have no right to return to home
ever. 
73. Indrek Paavle, “Soviet Investigations concerning the Activities of Estonian Defence
Battalions and Police Battalions of the German Armed Forces in 1941-1944,” in Hiio, Maripuu,
Paavle, eds., Estonia 1940-1945…, 877. 
74. On the Latvian case see Andrew Ezergailis, Nazi/Soviet Disinformation about the
Holocaust in Nazi-Occupied Latvia: Daugavas Vanagi: Who Are They — Revisited (Riga:
Latvijas 50 gadu okupacijas muzeja fonds, 2005), 55.
75. Birn, Die Sicherheitspolizei…, 232.
CLEANSING AND COMPROMISE 335
the repression of armed resistance and possible opposition, agents and informers
played a crucial role and they had to be recruited among the right circles.
Looking at the materials of the Extraordinary State Commission for Estonia, we
realise that some files, for example the ones about the brutal end of the Klooga
concentration camp, were compiled accurately and with great detail.76 Those files
can be used as sources for justice or historians. But the majority were written and
compiled in great haste and mainly based on the accounts of hardly reliable eye-
witnesses. They are inaccurate, cramped with factual errors, contain propaganda
and inflate damages and the number of victims.77 In other words, they cannot be
very useful for later thorough investigation.78 Of course, the Soviet army captured
trophy documents, which helped with the examination of atrocities and singling out
the guilty. But cleansing in Estonia and in the rest of the former German occupation
zone certainly possessed a campaign character. Quick results were needed. When
we look at interrogation protocols and listen to oral history narratives by those who
were arrested and survived imprisonment, it seems clear that painstaking
reconstruction of crimes and search for clear evidence did not rank high on the
Soviet agenda. Confessions could be obtained by torture and convictions could be
made on the basis of false accusations.79 Needless to say, among the victims of the
postwar purge there were some real perpetrators, murderers or collaborators, but
the overwhelming majority was by any ‘normal’ legal standard innocent or not
proven guilty.
Concerning treason against the fatherland, one may ask which country Estonian
citizens should have been loyal to. Their state had been occupied and annexed and
they received Soviet citizenship against their will. Immediately after the war, most
of them did not even possess any Soviet documents/passports, but still identified
themselves with an Estonian passport. In essence, they could not betray the USSR
because it was not their fatherland during the war. The Soviet leadership
acknowledged this somehow: this might partly explain why Estonians were treated
more leniently than the inhabitants of the ‘old republics’.
As concerns ‘horizontal collaboration’ with the Germans which, according to
oral history, was widespread in Estonia and made easier by the ‘high racial status’
that the Estonians received from the Nazis, the authors of this paper do not know of
any case of persecution by the Soviets. The country had served as a safe hinterland
76. GARF (Gosudarstvennyi arkhiv Rossiiskoi Federatsii), f. P-7021, op. 97, d. 1. 
77. The report of the Extraordinary Commission of the ESSR claimed at least 60,000 Estonian
victims of Nazi occupation (GARF, f. P-7021, op. 97, d. 871, l. 8), while in reality
approximately 8,000 victims including Estonia’s Jews and part of the Gypsie population were
killed by the Nazis.
78. On the commission in general see Marina Sorokina, “People and Procedures: Towards a
History of the Investigation of Nazi Crimes in the USSR,” Kritika: Explorations in Russian and
Eurasian History, 6 (2005): 797-831.
79. The persecution of collaborators faced the same problems as the one of German war
criminals. See Andreas Hilger, “Sowjetische Justiz und Kriegsverbrechen. Dokumente zu den
Verurteilungen deutscher Kriegsgefangener 1941-1949,” Vierteljahreshefte für Zeitgeschichte
54 (2006): 461-515.
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especially for short-term holidays from the front, because there was no partisan
activity and a well-sorted black market. Sexual relations with Germans were quite
common, given the fact that there was a lack of young Estonian males. German
soldiers were perceived by many Estonian women as polite and educated, and they
gave them access to rare goods.80
The armed, anti-Soviet resistance in Estonia was far weaker than in Lithuania or
western Ukraine. It was decentralised and lacking in leadership because potential
leaders had been arrested, often pre-emptively, as happened to approximately
1,000 members of ‘Self-Defence’ up to July 1945.81 Nevertheless, 1945 saw a peak
in armed resistance. According to the documentation of the Ministry of the Interior,
that year, 565 partisans were killed, 3,894 arrested and 1,494 legalised. In the
conflict, 111 members of security, soldiers and activists and 142 other citizens lost
their lives.82 In 1944, the primary task for the security organs upon their return was
similarly to re-establish an agent network and set it to work. Circulars no. 366/48 of
16 July 1943 and no. 478/89 of 1 October 1943 of the Soviet NKVD and NKGB
were used as guidelines in carrying out investigations and organising an agent-
operational activity.83 In attempting to appraise the effectiveness of the work being
done by agents, we can examine the progress of the struggle against the resistance
movement. The success that had been hoped for was not achieved in 1945, and the
weakness of the network of NKGB agents was mentioned as the primary reason for
this. The overwhelming majority of agents in the NKVD network were also
informers whose information proved to be either useless or only of momentary
usefulness. Considering the continual mobility of the ‘forest brothers’, it was not
particularly possible to use the information obtained from informers concerning
their location. The main problem was the lack of infiltrator agents. In September
1945, the leaders of operational groups in all county departments of the NKVD and
NKGB were obliged to create a network of infiltrator agents in bandit groups and
illegal formations and to use that network to liquidate ‘nationalist elements’.84
One of the main strategies to fight resistance was amnesties and legalisation.
The first amnesty was proclaimed in Estonia in October 1944, and a larger one in
May 1945. Georgii Perov, head of the CC VKP(b) Bureau for Estonia saw
80. On women’s experiences under German occupation see Rutt Hinrikus (ed.), Sõja ajal
kasvanud tüdrukud: Eesti naiste mälestused Saksa okupatsioonist [Girls Growing up during the
War: The Recollections of Estonian Women on the German Occupation] (Tallinn: Tänapäev,
2006).
81. Statiev, Social Conflict and Counterinsurgency…, 94.
82. “Spravka o rabote organov MVD Estonskoi SSR po likvidatsii natsionalisticheskogo
podpol´ia i ego vooruzhennykh band za period s 1944 po 1 iiunia 1953 goda,” Tannberg,
Politika Moskvy…, 289-297.
83. Letter of Aleksander Resev, head of NKVD ESSR, to all heads of County and Town
Departments of NKVD ESSR, 23 February 1944, ERAF 17/1-1-1, 28-30.
84. Kuusk, Nõukogude võimu lahingud…, 78-79. See also, for a comparison with the
Lithuanian SSR: Arvydas AnuÒauskas, “La composition et les méthodes secrètes des organes
de sécurité soviétiques en Lituanie, 1940-1953,” Cahiers du Monde russe, 42, 2-4 (2001): 321-
356.
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amnesties in June 1946 as a way to “return to legal existence people who hide in the
forests in fear of reprisals for service in the German Army, and evade conscription
into the Red Army and other similar offences.”85 According to Elena Zubkova, the
regime was ready for a compromise with those who accepted abandoning the armed
struggle.86 According to the Ministry of Interior, 3,000 people, mainly draft
dodgers, were legalised in the ESSR in 1945.87 In the process of legalisation, the
individual had to pass necessary information, which helped the security organs in
their struggle with the partisans.
In relation to membership in ‘Self-Defence’ for example, the party line was not
clear. We know that many members were arrested and persecuted, but leading party
officials like Arnold Veimer, head of Estonia’s Sovnarkom, argued convincingly
against a general persecution: “You consider that all men having served in ‘Self-
Defence’ are enemies, but you know that all men aged 16 to 55 were enlisted in
‘Self-Defence’. If you start action, think about this fact. You will build a wall
between you and the population.”88
The Estonian political leadership was far from being homogenous and its
members’ views were influenced by their background. Ethnic Estonians and
Russians born and raised in the country knew the local situation much better than
Russian speakers and ethnic Estonians from the ‘old republics’ delegated to work in
Estonia. In the party leadership dominated a group of former political prisoners
from Estonia who had joined the party in the interwar period and had served a
sentence during independence. Arnold Veimer was one of them. The so-called
‘June communists’ joined the party only after the communist takeover in the
summer of 1940. They often were intellectuals with a left-wing affiliation
(Johannes Vares-Barbarus, chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the
ESSR belonged to that group). First Party Secretary Nikolai Karotamm had lived
for a long time in the USSR, but cooperated closely with the former political
prisoners. Russian speakers from the ‘old republics’ were often sent to Estonia for
only a couple of years, did not usually speak the language and served as controllers
of the local party leadership. Among the ethnic Estonians many had strong feelings
of national and cultural identity, and they might be characterised as ‘national
communists’.89 While the Estonian leadership obviously shared the view that
cleansing was necessary, and actively participated in it, they nonetheless did not
want the scale of repression to become too large, or to have ethnic Estonians
85. Statiev, Social Conflict and Counterinsurgency…, 196.
86. Zubkova, Pribaltika i Kreml´…, 245.
87. Kuusk, Nõukogude võimu lahingud…, 109.
88. Stenographic protocol of a meeting of the party aparatus concerning the fight against
bandits, 7 August 1945, ERAF 1-4-246, 10. 
89. On the leadership in the Baltic republics see also Zubkova, Pribaltika i Kreml´…, 257-285;
on nationalities policy see David Feest, “‘Neo-Korenizacja’ in den baltischen
Sowjetrepubliken? Die Kommunistische Partei Estlands nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg,”
Zeitschrift für Geschichtswissenschaft, 54 (2006): 263-280.
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replaced by too many Russians. Estonia’s leading politicians had their own,
national, agenda, which favoured the search for a compromise.
Among the main reasons for the compromise policy was the lack of local cadres.
To run the Estonian SSR, Stalin needed ethnic Estonians. A certain amount of the
elite of Russia’s Estonians had been killed in the Great Terror (1937-38) during the
‘national operations’.90 As a result, cadres had to be recruited mainly inside
Estonia, even when their reliability was doubtful and their past was incriminating.
Table 1 gives an overview of the personnel composition of the people’s
commissariats of the ESSR in 1945. One must add that this only includes
information known to the regime: there obviously were many more German-army
veterans or former members of bourgeois parties among employees, but records
were not always available yet to check this. The presented data was compiled after a
first purge in the people’s commissariats. The political savvy of cadres was
definitely low, even among party members. Most of the employees would not have
been able to serve in a similar position in the ‘old republics’. It is remarkable that
even former members of the ‘Estonian Veterans’ League’ — a radical right wing
movement of the interwar period often characterised as fascist — were employed.
Table 1. Cadres of the people’s commissariats of the ESSR on 15 May 1945
90. Terry Martin, The Affirmative Action Empire: Nations and Nationalism in the Soviet
Union, 1923-1939 (Ithaca-London : Cornell University Press, 2001), 337-338. See also: Aadu
Must, “Venemaa eestlased ja Suur Terror: Elektrooniliste allikapublikatsioonide andmete
kriitiline analüüs [Russia’s Estonians and the Great Terror: Critical Analysis of Data from
Electronical Source Publications],” Ajalooline Ajakiri, 3, 118 (2002): 47-84.
Total on 15 May 1945 4,896
During German occupation in Estonia 3,198
Ethnic Estonians 4,010
Members of the Communist Party 445
Former members of bourgeois organisations 573
Among them: ‘Self-Defence’ 17
‘Kaitseliit’ (Militia of the interwar period) 232
‘Estonian Veterans’ League (right wing movement) 11
Political education: Courses for Soviet party activists 81
Party school 40
Communist university 20





Source: Statistical overview, RGASPI f. 598, o. 1, d. 2, l. 39-41.
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In the countryside, the lack of cadres was even greater. Of the 615 chairmen of
village Soviets, 568 did spend the period of German occupation in Estonia. Some of
them had obviously been on a similar position as village elder or secretary. The
Communist party had only three members among the chairmen, while 82 were
reported to be former members of bourgeois organisations and 31 had served in
‘Self-Defence’. Only 12 of the chairmen were not ethnic Estonians.91 Under those
circumstances, the regime had to tolerate some black spots in the lives of low-
ranking officials, especially given the enormous elite losses. On the village and
parish level, the situation differed enormously. In some places, all local officials
were replaced, in others mostly the same administrators remained in office as
previously, under German rule.
According to Soviet nationalities’ policy, reliable ethnic Estonians had to be
promoted, but they were in short supply, a fact calling again for some toleration.
Right from the moment when the Red Army re-entered Estonia, the regime tried to
win the Estonians by offering amnesties, a measure especially aimed at weakening
the resistance movement. Further, the poor strata of rural society were supposed to
benefit from a repetition of land reform. In addition, a certain lack of information
should not be underestimated. All this led to a double standard of sorts. Many of
those punished were persecuted for minor offences or were even innocent by Soviet
standards. Others, especially those needed by the regime, could remain untouched.
We can identify two layers of compromise policy, at the central and local levels.
The central authorities were in need of personnel; they wanted to win over the
Estonians even under conditions of campaign justice.92 On the local level, old
networks continued to function, helping relatives, friends and acquaintances of the
powerful to escape persecution and find employment and a place in society.93 After
the war, there still existed some continuity with the prewar period in the countryside.
Rural life did finally change during the process of forced collectivisation of
agriculture starting in 1949.
When comparing the scale of repression, approximately 13 to 15,000 political
arrests in 1944-1945, with possible groups of victims from Estonia, we become
aware to what extent the regime was aiming at a compromise besides the grim
cleansing. More than 50,000 Estonian veterans of German units and a larger amount
of former ‘Self-Defence’ members were on Soviet-controlled territory after the end
of the war. The special card files continued to expand. Nevertheless, nearly one third
of all the people arrested in 1944-1945 were actually from active resistance. 
Cleansing continued after 1945. In November 1946, during a meeting with
members of the county commissions for land reform, Estonia’s First Party Secretary
Nikolai Karotamm raised the issue once again: “Comrades, we will identify the real
91. Quality of the cadres of chairmen of village Soviets, 1 November 1945, RGASPI, f. 598,
o. 1, d. 2, ll. 124-125.
92. ‘Campaign justice’, term coined by Yoram Gorlizki for the different waves of persecution
having a campaign character.
93. O. Mertelsmann, “The Private Sphere in Estonia during Stalinism,” Problemy istorii,
filologii, kul´tury, XVIII (2007): 61.
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supporters of the Germans and there is still much work ahead. We will probably be
finding German spies and nationalists during the next ten years. We have to search
for them today and punish them.”94 In August 1946, Karotamm spoke about the
amnesty policy to local party organisers (partorgs): “A murderer is a murderer, a
deserter is a deserter, but a person on guarding duty at a bridge or a haystack is
something else. I want to say, on my, the party’s and the government’s behalf, that
there is a directive stipulating that not a single person who comes out of the wood and
is not a bandit, should be arrested. If you hear about such an incident that a person
was legalised, had come out of hiding and been arrested by local authorities, please
let me know, so that I may interfere and restore order.”95 In fact, in 1954-1956, ten
years after the end of the war in Estonia, 300 former German army veterans or
members of ‘Self-Defence’ left the underground and legalised their existence.96
Cleansing and purges were only one aspect of Soviet policy in Estonia. The other
was a policy of compromise. Both were, of course, interconnected. Since the
regime was initially weak, there existed no other possibility to win the day except
for handling the Estonians like the Chechens. According to oral history, people
adapted their life stories to be fit for Soviet Estonia.97 Archival sources do not
openly express the extent of the compromise policy, but it can be read between the
lines. Cleansing and purges continued nonetheless until Stalin’s death. At the same
time, the process of putting up with the regime was on the way. The need for show
trials was felt much later.
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